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THE ETHICS OF PROSECUTION 
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Introduction 
 
This article considers the codes of conduct of professionals carrying out prosecution work, 
and obedience to these codes.  Such codes are referred to as the “legal ethics” of the 
respective professions.  Three codes of conduct apply:  The Code for Crown Prosecutors, 
the Solicitors Code of Conduct and the Code of Conduct for the Bar. 
 
The system of prosecution may be thought only to initiate a process which goes on to 
adjudication in court, but the decision to prosecute is crucial to that initiation and has its 
own effects on the criminal justice system and on the individuals concerned, quite separate 
from the adjudication of guilt.  The amount of discretion involved in the decision to 
prosecute is wide.   
 
The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure in 1981 criticised the previous prosecution 
arrangements on the basis of three standards:  fairness, openness and accountability, and 
efficiency.  It recommended the adoption of the higher evidential standards of “reasonable 
prospects” of a conviction for the new Crown Prosecution Service.2  This would stop the 
“prosecution momentum”3 of the conveyor belt, and make active decisions.  This test 
became the current test of “a realistic prospect of conviction”.  Mansfield and Peay 
suggested that such a test required “prosecutors to possess qualities more akin to 
soothsayers than lawyers”.  McConville et al suggest that the CPS utilize “the 
contradictory and malleable nature of the principles in the codes to further narrowly 
conceived objectives and, at its worst, adopting an uncritical support-the-police mandate”4 
The operation of the codes of conduct is crucial in such an environment. 
The Report of Sir Iain Glidewell on the Crown Prosecution Service considers the 
financing, management, organisation and competence of the service but not its ethical 
standards or the ethics of those who work within it.5 Although there may be some 
relationship between competence and ethics, a lawyer may be incompetent but ethical or 
unethical and competent.  This study is intended to raise a new point arising out of 
observations and discussions with people working within the criminal justice system. The 
study represents work in progress covering a small sample of cases observed and follow-up 
research with lawyers involved in the conduct of criminal cases.6  In relation to issues of 
                                                 
1 Woolf Professor of Legal Education, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London. 
2 See paragraph 9.2 of the Royal Commission Report on Criminal Procedure, Cmnd, 8092 of 1981 
3 Mansfield, G. and Peay, J. (1987) The Director of Public Prosecutions (London and New York, Tavistock 
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5 The Review of the Crown Prosecution Service (Chairman: Rt. Hon. Sir Iain Glidewell) Cm 3972. 
6This article is based on a number of elements: preparation of a course of training in legal ethics for a group 
of prosecutors; a period of watching a number of criminal hearings and trials and advising on new conduct 
rules for the bar and the solicitor’s professions relating to these; acting as observer to an entire criminal 
legal ethics covering an area as serious in its consequences as prosecution, one case which 
breaches those ethical principles7 is enough to support a considerable concern about the 
process of prosecution and therefore about major policy decisions currently being 
considered for the role of prosecutors. This includes, in particular, whether Crown 
Prosecutors should have rights of audience.  
 
The article considers three related issues: the nature of the conduct regime, change in 
climate or culture of prosecution and specific observed breaches of the conduct code. 
 
1. The Conduct Regime 
 
There exist a number of different sets of conduct for prosecutors.  The Solicitor’s Code has 
its own set of specific ethical obligations for advocates in general and those who have 
obtained Higher Court advocacy rights in particular.  The Barrister’s Code with its recently 
amended Annexe H deals with ethics in criminal cases.  Each has general principles 
relating to ethics overall, specific principles relating to advocacy, specific principles 
relating to crime and criminal advocacy and specific principles relating to prosecution as 
opposed to defence work.   
 
In addition to these principles which apply to all solicitors on the Roll of Solicitors8 and all 
Barristers in private or employed practice, there is also a Code for Crown Prosecutors.  
This seems to exist in three forms.  A public Code for Crown Prosecutors is published and 
is freely open to the public.9   A second public document, the Explanatory Memorandum to 
the Code, is intended to provide further commentary.10  There also exists a much more 
detailed set of guidance for Crown Prosecutors, possibly called “National Casework 
Guidelines” relating to their work in general and in relation to specific offences, but which 
is not made public, and has not been made available.11.  It seems to exist, in four or five 
loose leaf files which are updated and amended fairly frequently.   
 
The codes for Solicitors and Barristers are reinforced by a fairly complex structure of 
complaints mechanisms, policing, adjudicatory tribunals and powers of punishment. A 
similar separate regime does not appear to exist in relation to members of the Crown 
Prosecution Service and in relation to their own ethical code. 
 
All conduct rules are mandatory on legal professionals and are based on ethical principles 
intended to be of benefit to clients and society.12  They are not written as mere guidance, 
                                                                                                                                                    
process from beginning to end; and leading a team of researchers investigating the new pilot public defender 
system in Scotland. 
7 See e.g. Z Barman  Searching for a Centre that Holds  in Featherstone, M et al (eds) Globalisation  
(London, Sage, 1995) and “The Ethical Imagination”, Editorial by Economides and Webb in  Issues of Legal 
Ethics, 1,1 1998. 
8 Paragraph 4.01 of the Solicitors’ Code of Conduct states, 
“A solicitor employed by a non-solicitor is subject to the same principles of professional conduct as a 
solicitor in private practice.” 
9 Now contained at the back of The Blue Book, Stone’s Justices Manual. 
10 Curiously this, unlike the Code itself, is published only in a form including both English and Welsh. 
11 The Explanatory Memorandum refers to “the Programme of National Casework Guidelines designed to 
assist Crown Prosecutors in cases which are complex or difficult”.  
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12 See e.g. Cranston, R.  Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995)  pps 
1-6 and Luban, D. (ed)  The Good Lawyer:  Lawyers Rôles and Lawyers’ Ethics 1983, and for a discussion 
and even a trivial breach of the rules is subject to punishment or marked against the  
professional’s record.  The code for Crown Prosecutors, although now seen as a public 
declaration of quality statement, is also a code of conduct in these terms. 
 
The changes in the CPS Code over the last ten years may be compared with the 
consistency of approach to be found in the Solicitor and Bar’s Codes of Conduct.  The 
third version of the Code published in 1994 was completely different from its 
predecessors.  Ashworth and Fionda13 noted the change of emphasis towards prosecution, 
particularly in relation to young defendants.  And they queried the independence of the 
CPS in the light of politically inspired changes of policy.  Hoyano et al14 were 
commissioned by the CPS to study the impact of the third revised code.  Most prosecutors 
said they seldom consulted it as it was too basic.  They used the CPS Prosecution Manual 
not the “Noddy’s Guide”.  33% of prosecutors thought the new code was intended to direct 
them to prosecute more cases, although some, including one branch Crown Prosecutor, 
thought it had raised the standard higher.  Very few believed it had made any difference.  
One called it “New English Bible” rather than “King James’s Version”. 
 
In particular, four items to which previous versions of the code said a Crown Prosecutor 
must have regard in evaluating the evidence, do not appear in version three, nor in the 
Explanatory Memorandum.  These are: 
 
5 iii  “Does it appear that a witness is exaggerating, or his memory is faulty or that he is 
either hostile or friendly to the accused, or may be otherwise unreliable?” 
5 v  “Are there matters which might properly be put to a witness by the defence to 
attack his credibility?” 
5 vi  “What sort of impression is the witness likely to make? How is he likely to stand 
up to cross examination? Does he suffer from any physical or mental disability 
which is likely to affect his credibility?” 
5 xii  “Are the facts of the case such that the public would consider it oppressive to 
proceed against the accused?” 
 
A Conduct Regime also includes the notion of discipline.  The system of discipline in 
relation to breach of the CPS code is a little difficult to comprehend, or perhaps to believe.  
Crown Prosecutors who are solicitors or barristers may be in breach of their professional 
ethical code under those headings and therefore, in theory, a complaint against them could 
be made directly to their professional bodies.  Although statistics appear not to be kept, 
relating to how many complaints are made against Crown Prosecutors, informal 
information from the Office of the Supervision of Solicitors suggests that few such 
complaints are entertained there.  If a complaint came through it would normally be 
redirected to the Crown Prosecution Service itself, especially since most complaints are in 
the nature of “they should not have prosecuted me”.  There is intuitive information of a 
very small number of complaints coming from the CPS itself, having gone through their 
system before being forwarded to the Office of the Supervision of Solicitors.15 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
of such issues in the criminal context see Ashworth, A.  Ethics and Criminal Justice in Cranston (op cit) pps. 
145-151. 
13 [1994] Crim L. R.  814 
14 [1997] Crim L.R. 556 
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15 Telephone conversation with Stewart Waterson and Annie Reece at the OSS. 
The CPS publishes a leaflet suggesting that complaints are answered within three days.  
This would not appear to provide sufficient opportunity for a considered, measured or 
adjudicated response and must therefore be treated with some caution. 
 
It is not possible to obtain data on how many complaints are received annually under the 
CPS system or what the results of such complaints might be.16  This is in direct contrast to 
the full annual figures available from solicitors and the bar.17 
 
Ashworth and Fionda18  agree.  Apart from a few judicial review decisions19 the CPS is not 
openly accountable and the new Code, being less detailed and more vague, makes judicial 
review more difficult.  Removing matters to the restricted Manuals makes the CPS less 
accountable and Ashworth and Fionda ask whether external review or audit would be 
better than periodic enquiries by the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee and the 
Audit Commission.  
 
In summary, the CPS code has been manipulated and there does not appear to be a public, 
open system of discipline at all, as opposed to a system for complaints handling. 
 
2 - Change In Culture, Approach And Ethical Standard 
 
The traditional description of the position of the prosecutor as “a minister of justice” is to 
present a comparison between the prosecutor who is supposed to be open and fair and not 
partial and the defendant’s representatives who will be partial and one sided.20  This also 
represents the position stated in both the Solicitors’ and Bar’s Codes of Conduct. 
 
Paragraph 21.19 the Solicitors’ Code says, 
“Whilst a solicitor prosecuting a criminal case must ensure that every material point is 
made which supports the prosecution, the evidence must be presented dispassionately and 
with scrupulous fairness.”   
 
It goes on to lay out in some detail how this should be presented and how evidence should 
be given to the defence if it is not to be used by the prosecution but might assist the 
defence.  Para. 21.19 sub paragraphs 1-3 cover the items 5.iii, 5.v and 5.xii of the first two 
versions of the CPS Code which has been removed from the current version: 
 
                                                 
16 Letter on file 29/4/98, from CPS stating such information does not  currently exist. 
17 Sherr and Webley, 1997 International Journal of the Legal Profession p 121.  See also National Consumer 
Council Report, The Solicitors Complaints Bureau - The Consumer’s View Ole Hansen, 1994. 
18 Op. Cit. (1994) 
19 See Osborne, P. Judicial Fairness of Prosecutors’ Discretion - The Ascent to full Revisionability (1992)43 
N.I. Legal Quarterly pps 179-197 and see also Blomfield [1997] 1 Cr. App. R. 135 and Townsend [1998] 
Crim. L.R. 126. 
20 See for example Compton J. in R. v. Puddick (1865) 4 F. & F. 497 at p.499, approved in R. v. Banks 
[1916] 2 K. B. 621; 12 Cr. App. R. 74 (Avory J. - “counsel for the prosecution throughout a case ought not 
to struggle for the verdict against the prisoner, but they ought to bear themselves rather in the character of 
ministers of justice assisting in the administration of justice”,  p. 76) 
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“Solicitor for prosecution 
 
1. The prosecutor should state all relevant facts and should limit expressions of opinion to 
those fairly required to present the case.  He or she should reveal any mitigating 
circumstances and should inform the court of its sentencing powers if invited to do so 
and whenever it appears to be under a misapprehension about those powers.  See also 
paragraph 7.1(b)-(c) of the Advocacy Code (Annex 21A at p.353). 
2. If a prosecutor obtains evidence which he or she does not intend to use but which may 
assist the defence, the prosecutor must supply particulars of statements made by those 
witnesses.  If, however, the prosecutor knows of a credible witness who can speak to 
material facts which tend to show the accused to be innocent, he or she must either call 
that witness or make the statement available to the defence.  Further, if the prosecutor 
knows, not of a credible witness, but a witness whom he or she does not accept as 
credible, the prosecutor should tell the defence about the witness so that they can call 
that person if they wish.  The prosecutor must reveal to the defence factual evidence of 
which he or she has knowledge and which is inconsistent with that which he or she, as 
prosecutor, has presented or proposes to present to the court.  See also paragraph 2.2 of 
the Advocacy Code at p.347. 
3. The prosecutor must reveal all relevant cases and statutory provisions known to him or 
her whether it be for or against the prosecution’s case.  This is so whether or not the 
prosecutor has been called upon to agreed to point in question.  See also 21.07 note. 3, 
p.336. and paragraph 2.2 of the Advocacy Code, at p.347.” 
 
Similarly the Bar’s Code of Conduct Annexe H has a set of principles relating to 
“responsibilities of prosecuting counsel”.  In particular, items 11.1 and 11.2 state, 
 
“11.1 Prosecuting counsel should not attempt to obtain a conviction by all means at his 
command.  He should not regard himself as appearing for a party.  He should lay 
before the Court fairly and impartially the whole of the facts which comprise the 
case for the prosecution and should assist the Court on all matters of law applicable 
to the case. 
 11.2 Prosecuting counsel should bear in mind at all times whilst he is instructed that he 
is responsible for the presentation and general conduct of the case and that it is his 
duty to ensure that all relevant evidence is either presented by the prosecution or 
made available to the defence.” 
 
The approach of the prosecutor is therefore not partisan.  As a “Minister of Justice” the 
prosecutor sees both sides of the case, is able to weigh the facts dispassionately, is helpful 
to the defence in providing information which otherwise might not be available to them in 
revealing the truth and organising justice, presents the case clearly and dispassionately to 
the finder of the facts.  The prosecutor does the job of prosecution by being open, fair, 
courteous and honest to the defence and the court.  There is no triumph in winning, nor any 
sorrow in losing.  It is the job of the Minister of Justice, the dispassionate advisor and 
advocate. 
 
This position is clear from both the Bar and the Solicitors’ Codes of Conduct.  Both have 
had more recent versions published than the Code for Crown Prosecutors of 1994.  It is the 
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creed which is taught to new law students and lawyers.21  It is the ethics of prosecution 
which underlies the system of criminal justice in the Common Law world. 
 
Observation of some criminal cases recently22 has presented clear evidence that this 
approach is still dear to the hearts of many advocates, and also some of those operating 
within the Crown Prosecution Service itself.  But also noted was a major underlying 
change of attitude within the Crown Prosecution Service, and of some counsel prosecuting 
on their behalf, which throws these principles to the wind.  On enquiry among those who 
work day to day in criminal defence these observations are echoed and fears compounded. 
 
It would appear that the climate of competition, of relative case statistics, and of 
performance or quality indicators within the Crown Prosecution Service, had eaten away at 
the fundamental principles of the ethics of prosecution itself.  This would have effects not 
only on innocent defendants, but also on prosecution witnesses who should never have 
been there and never been sacrificed at trial on the altar of some Crown Prosecutor’s need 
for statistics, or a fashionable view of what might get a good press the next day. 
 
It is clear that ingrained principles do not disappear for everyone overnight.  Apparently, 
two counsel refused the case of Professor Cottingham before the CPS found somebody else 
to take it.23  A number of the counsel for the prosecution in cases observed also clearly 
espoused the traditional approach.  But there were cases where prosecution counsel, 
including Queen’s Counsel in one case, toed a different line and a different approach.  Not 
only the Crown Prosecution Service itself, but also the barristers who prosecuted for them, 
were involved in the prosecution process in a manner quite contrary to the spirit and the 
letter of the ethical code. 
 
Any such approach, and any breach of the conduct code, even on the part of individual 
prosecutors, is wrong, cannot be ignored and needs to be corrected.  If this is widespread, 
however, it would clearly reflect a change of culture which is designed and supported 
within the organisation itself, and has been brought in through the back door, and against 
the Codes of Conduct of both Solicitors and the Bar. 
 
In summary, a major change away from the “Minister of Justice” approach to prosecution 
was noted.  This change of approach seems quite contrary to the Codes of Conduct of both 
Solicitors and Bar and also appears to be contrary to the professed Code of Conduct of the 
Crown Prosecution Service.  Such a change in attitude and approach, through the back 
door, would not be tolerated in relation to any other areas of professional ethics.  In this 
particular context, the approach undermines the basis of the system of criminal justice, and 
can have massive effects on individuals caught up in the process. 
 
3 - Individual Breaches Of Conduct Observed 
 
A number of individual breaches of the Ethical Codes, which were considered to be 
serious, were also noted.  
Discourtesy on the part of the prosecution to the defence was witnessed, misleading the 
defence and the court, withholding evidence or ignoring obvious sources of evidence 
                                                 
21 See ACLEC First Report on Legal Education, 1996 pps 17-18. 
22 See footnote 6 above. 
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which would assist the defence case and which would have been essential in preparing the 
prosecution case according to the ethical rules. 
 
Some items would appear to be comparatively minor but had serious consequences.  One 
police officer sitting behind counsel at a pre-trial hearing about evidence requested by the 
defence, passed to a Crown Prosecutor and counsel information which was quite untrue 
and which misled the court.  The item itself was minor.  The police were being asked when 
they last visited a site to obtain documentary evidence.  The police officer told the Crown 
Prosecutor who told counsel who told the court that the last visit had been approximately 
three months before the actual last visit.  The police officer herself had made the 
subsequent visit and either did not remember correctly or misled the court.  The effect of 
this small exchange was to prevent the prosecution being involved in obtaining evidence 
which would assist the defence, and undermine the prosecution case, whether or not it 
might uncover the truth. 
 
In the same case the Crown Prosecutor did not enquire into obvious issues, which were a 
matter of record, relating to prosecution witnesses, or if they did, they did not pass that 
information over to the defence.  Seemingly minor conduct breaches have potential 
catastrophic effects.  Indeed, by misleading the court, by not assisting in any way with 
third party discovery, they hide evidence which would undermine their case.  In doing so, 
innocent defendants can suffer until found ‘not guilty’.  But, not only does such 
misjudgement affect defendants, one cannot underestimate the effect of such bad, and 
unethical, decisions on witnesses involved in a frightening and completely unnecessary 
process before and in court.  Although some forensic licence must be allowed and there is 
always some uncertainty as to what will happen in trial, clearly unethical decisions are 
being made about strategy, conduct and process of trial by prosecutors who seem not to be 
troubled by Codes of Conduct nor answerable or accountable to any disciplinary measures. 
 
Such breaches are not simply technical.  They can cause great pain to individuals 
concerned, waste public money and bring the system of prosecution and criminal justice 
into disrepute. 
 
Behaviours witnessed would constitute, if carried out by a solicitor, breaches of the 
Solicitors Code, Rule 1a,d,e and f.24  There were also breaches of the Solicitors’ Code, 
paragraph 21.19 rule 1, rule 2 and a breach of the Barristers’ Code Annexe H rules 11.1 
and 11.2.  
 
Similarly there would have been breaches of the Crown Prosecutors Code version two 
paragraphs 5.ii, 5.iv, 5.v and 5.vi (set out above) which have been removed from version 
                                                 
24 Rule 1 of The Solicitors’ Code of Conduct, 1996 says “A solicitor shall not do anything in the course of 
practising as a solicitor, or permit another person to do anything on his or her behalf, which compromises or 
impairs or is likely to compromise or impair any of the following: 
 
(a) the solicitor’s independence or integrity; 
(b) a person’s freedom to instruct a solicitor of his or her choice; 
(c) the solicitor’s duty to act in the best interests of the client; 
(d) the good repute of the solicitor or of the solicitors’ profession; 
(e) the solicitor’s proper standard of work; 
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(f) the solicitor’s duty to the Court” 
three of the Code but which have not been changed and must be elsewhere since they are 
fundamental principles.25 
 
When such breaches occur there is no information on who detects them, who reports them, 
who polices them, who adjudicates them, where the figures are and why are they not 
published two years after the rather late creation of the internal CPS Inspectorate. 
 
In summary, direct, detailed breaches of the Solicitors’, the Bar’s and the Crown 
Prosecutors’ Code occur.  They are not commented on by defence lawyers who seem to 
accept them as part of the normal scene.  They are not what is taught to new and qualified 
lawyers.  They are wrong and they can have considerable consequences. 
 
Conclusion 
 
A fair and open system of prosecution is crucial to the proper administration of justice, to 
the relationship between the individual and the state and to ensure that the guilty are found 
guilty and the innocent are left alone or found innocent. In a postmodern world 
presentation might be considered to be the same as reality.  But the presentation of a vague 
Code giving Crown Prosecutors an easy ride, an internal complaints system without 
openness and accountability in explaining what happens with complaints, lack of 
publication of the real ethical rules which are now provided elsewhere for the Service in 
unpublished loose leaf files, all go against the very standards criticised by the Royal 
Commission.  This is a public service performing an essential and major function and it 
should be open to scrutiny. 
 
Neither does the Crown Prosecution Service appear to act fairly in terms of the ethical 
rules which are placed on them.  Both the change in general culture and detailed breaches 
of the Codes have been considered. If the principles are wrong they must be changed.  
Until then they must be enforced.  They are intended to safeguard not just the good name 
of the profession, but also the needs of clients, the public and other actors within the 
criminal justice and civil justice systems.  They are certainly  not there to be obeyed or 
disobeyed at the personal whim of the professionals concerned.   
 
The new CPS approach does not result in any greater measure of success.  Less than 60% 
of contested cases in the Crown Court ended in conviction in 1996.  In 1978, before the 
CPS was thought of the figure was 50%26, hardly the massive difference expected.  So 
something else is occurring here.  In some more public cases with a populist or “political” 
import one may detect a climate of “prosecution as punishment”.  This is surely 
“prosecution as persecution” in the words of Mansfield and Peay.27 
 
Under these circumstances one cannot see how it could be in the interests of justice to give 
members of the Crown Prosecution Service rights of audience in their own cases.28  It 
                                                 
25 See Para 3.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the code, “Some sections of the previous Code have 
been left out.  This is because either they are no longer of relevance or they are better placed in other 
guidance which Crown Prosecutors receive; for example, because they are too detailed for a Code which 
explains the basic principles.” 
26 McConville and Baldwin  Courts, Prosecution and Conviction  (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981,  p6) 
27 Op. Cit. 
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28 Rights of Audience and Rights to Conduct Litigation in England and Wales:  The Way Ahead  Lord 
Chancellor’s Department June 1998 p.36.  And see also the new Clause 47 in  the Crime and Disorder Bill 
cannot be correct to allow the partiality of this service, its internal performance indicators 
pressurising individuals towards particular approaches, also to carry out the independent 
role which the court needs as an essential part of making its decisions fairly and openly in 
the interests of society, in the interests of the state and in the interests of individuals.  If 
they cannot carry out their current role ethically, how can they be expected, given more 
power and control over what gets to the court and what is said there, to suddenly behave in 
an ethically fair and responsible manner?   
 
Prosecution, the decision to prosecute, needs the intermediary of an independent mind, of 
someone with detachment and balance, as Lord Chancellor Hailsham said in the House of 
Lords in 1972 “as an added safeguard of individual freedom since it involves that a second 
opinion is always brought to bear”.29  The Benson Commission, Sir Patrick Mayhew, Lady 
Marre and the government White Papers on Legal Aid similarly all warn of the dangers 
inherent in not having the “detachment and balance” of an independent advocate as an 
essential component in fair and responsible prosecution.30  The Prosecution Service needs 
to be more controlled and not given more power. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
giving non-legal “suitable case worker” CPS staff leave to begin and progress criminal proceedings - Edward 
White, “Crime, disorder-and suitable caseworkers” 1998, 3rd April Sol. Journal. 
29 Quoted in Southwell, R. 1989 The Crown Prosecution Service, In The Quality of Justice - The Bar’s 
Response   pps 146-162 
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